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Abstract
Background: In 2005, India launched the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) to strengthen the
primary healthcare system. NRHM also aims to encourage pregnant women, particularly of low
socioeconomic backgrounds, to use institutional maternal healthcare. We evaluated the impacts of
NRHM on socioeconomic inequities in the uptake of institutional delivery and antenatal care (ANC)
across high-focus (deprived) Indian states.
Methods: Data from District Level Household and Facility Surveys (DLHS) Rounds 1 (1995–99) and
2 (2000–04) from the pre-NRHM period, and Round 3 (2007–08), Round 4 and Annual Health Survey
(2011–12) from post-NRHM period were used. Wealth-related and education-related relative
indexes of inequality, and pre-post difference-in-differences models for wealth and education ter-
tiles, adjusted for maternal age, rural-urban, caste, parity and state-level fixed effects, were
estimated.
Results: Inequities in institutional delivery declined between pre-NRHM Period 1 (1995–99) and
pre-NRHM Period 2 (2000–04), but thereafter demonstrated steeper decline in post-NRHM periods.
Uptake of institutional delivery increased among all socioeconomic groups, with (1) greater effects
among the lowest and middle wealth and education tertiles than highest tertile, and (2) larger
equity impacts in the late post-NRHM period 2011–12 than in the early post-NRHM period 2007–08.
No positive impact on the uptake of ANC was found in the early post-NRHM period 2007–08; how-
ever, there was considerable increase in the uptake of, and decline in inequity, in uptake of ANC in
most states in the late post-NRHM period 2011–12.
Conclusion: In high-focus states, NRHM resulted in increased uptake of maternal healthcare, and
decline in its socioeconomic inequity. Our study suggests that public health programs in develop-
ing country settings will have larger equity impacts after its almost full implementation and widest
outreach. Targeting deprived populations and designing public health programs by linking mater-
nal and child healthcare components are critical for universal access to healthcare.
Keywords: Antenatal care, institutional delivery, Indian states, maternal healthcare, National Rural Health Mission, public health
program, socioeconomic inequity
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Introduction
India has the highest number of maternal and infant deaths worldwide
and accounts for one-fifth of all global maternal mortalities, and
21% of the children of less than five dying every day in the world are
Indians (International Institute for Population Sciences and Macro
International 2007; The World Bank 2014). There exist large inequal-
ities in maternal and infant mortality rates across Indian states, as
well as significant gaps between wealthy and deprived groups within
these states (International Institute for Population Sciences and
Macro International 2007; International Institute for Population
Sciences and Macro International 2010). Children from the poorest
communities are more likely to die before they reach the age of 5 (Save
the Children 2010) and stillbirths and neonatal mortality rates are
higher than those of higher income groups (Joshi 2009). Promoting
maternal and child health services such as ante-natal care (ANC), insti-
tutional delivery and child immunisation reduces maternal and infant
mortality rates (Martines et al. 2005; World Health Organisation
2005; Langlois 2013). Even though most of the primary healthcare in
public health facilities is available free of charge, the use of maternal
and child health services are still relatively low with considerable socio-
economic inequity within and across the Indian states (Pallikadavath
et al. 2004; Vora et al. 2009; Pathak et al. 2010; Sanneving et al. 2013;
Joe 2014).
To address these longstanding inequalities, the Indian government
launched National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) in 2005. Its aim was
to strengthen the primary healthcare system. One of the key thrusts here
was to encourage pregnant women, particularly those of low socioeco-
nomic backgrounds, to use institutional maternal and child healthcare.
The NRHM had a set of core strategies including increasing public health
funding, decentralising village and district level health planning and man-
agement, strengthening the public health service delivery infrastructure,
particularly at village, primary and secondary levels, and promoting the
non-profit sectors to increase social participation and community em-
powerment (Planning Commission of India 2001; Government of India
2014b; Sharma and Joe 2014). To ensure wide outreach the NRHM em-
ployed ‘Accredited Social Health Activists’ (ASHA) at the grass-roots (vil-
lage) level to support the use of services (Government of India 2014). One
of the important components of the NHRM was the ‘Janani Suraksha
Yojana’ (JSY), a cash-transfer programme, which provided financial sup-
port to enable women from lower socio-economic groups to give birth in
a health facility (Lim et al. 2010; Government of India 2014a).
NRHM implementation varied across the 18 high-focus (deprived)
and the 10 low-focus (developed) states, determined by maternal and
child health indicators. On one hand, the high-focus states, where the
program was first rolled out, were entitled to more funds from the
central government and additional technical and managerial support.
Furthermore, in the high-focus states, all pregnant women were eli-
gible for JSY financial support of Indian rupee (INR) 1400 ( US$25)
per birth, and benefits were paid irrespective of the birth order, age
and socioeconomic position. On the other hand, the JSY financial as-
sistance of INR 800 ( US$14) in the low-focus states was limited to
women who are below the poverty line, married and aged 19 or more.
Research has found that NRHM’s JSY payments were associated
with increases in health facility births and decline in neonatal mor-
tality (Lim et al. 2010; Gupta et al. 2012; Panja et al. 2012; Randive
et al. 2013), improvement in immunization rates and breastfeeding
practices (Carvalho 2014), decline in economic inequality in institu-
tional delivery in the districts of higher JSY coverage, and decline in
maternal mortality in richest districts than in the poorest (Randive
2014). Most of the available studies examined the effects specific to
JSY payments, by defining those who had received JSY financial
payment as treatment groups, and those who did not as control
groups. Understanding the population level impacts of NRHM are
critical for India’s health policy and planning, particularly when the
country is thriving to achieve its aspirations to attain universal
healthcare coverage through exploring several alternative strategies
including supply-side strengthening and demand-side financing. To
our knowledge, studies have yet to assess the population-level im-
pact of NRHM. Furthermore, no studies have examined the impacts
of the program design of NRHM. JSY is one of the major compo-
nents of NRHM focusing on promoting the uptake of institutional
delivery through conditional cash-transfer to mothers and ASHAs.
This cash-transfer to mothers was not linked to the uptake of ante-
natal care (ANC). Any impact of NRHM might be driven by the
JSY’s conditional cash-transfer for the uptake of institutional deliv-
ery, and so may neglect other components of primary healthcare
such as ANC, at least in the early post-NRHM period. However,
from 2009 to 2010 onwards, several state governments revised the
JSY guidelines to also promote the provision of ANC. For instance,
in 2009, the Chhattisgarh government made ensuring the provision
of ANC one of the eligibility conditions for payment of incentives to
ASHAs (Government of Chhattisgarh 2009). Furthermore, the
NRHM framework of implementation suggests that the full imple-
mentation of the program with wider outreach will be attained over
time (Government of India 2016). For example, the NRHM aimed
to achieve 50% coverage of the villages with fully trained ASHA by
2007, and 100% by 2008. Nonetheless, the target of setting up of
Village Health and Sanitation Committee in each village was 30%
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by 2007 and 100% by 2008, and the target of setting up (and
strengthening) of Sub Health Centres with two auxiliary nurse
midwives (ANM) employed was 60% by 2009 and 100% by 2010.
The aim was for most targets to be met by the end of 2010, while
the remainder by the end of 2012. However, most of the available
studies that assessed the effects of JSY were based on the early post-
NRHM period data of 2006–08, thus excluding the program effects
after almost full implementation and widest outreach.
Here, using a difference-in-differences study design, we evaluated
the impact of NRHM on socioeconomic inequity in the uptake of insti-
tutional delivery and ANC. Since the JSY of NRHM gives cash-
transfers to mothers and ASHAs conditional on using institutional de-
livery, whereas no cash-transfer is supplied for the use of ANC until
2010 to the ASHAs, we hypothesise that the impact of NRHM is more
likely to be seen in increased uptake of, and reduced socioeconomic in-
equity in institutional delivery, but not on ANC use in the early post-
NRHM period. Based on the data availability, we classified the post-
NRHM period into ‘early post-NRHM-period 2007–08’ and ‘late
post-NRHM period 2011–12’. We further hypothesise that greater
equity impacts of NRHM in terms of uptake of institutional delivery
and ANC is likely to be seen in the late post-NRHM period of widest
outreach of the program than in the early post-NRHM period.
Methods
Study design
Using a quasi-natural experiment study design, we analysed four
national-level cross-sectional survey datasets in the pre- and post
NRHM periods.
Study samples
Of the 18 high-focus states, we considered eight empowered action
group (EAG) states and seven north-eastern (NE) states in this ana-
lysis. The EAG states, where 46% Indian population live, were lag-
ging behind in containing population growth and, compared with
the rest of the Indian states, had poorer socio-economic, demo-
graphic and health indicators. Thus, the committee named
‘Empowered Action Group’, set up by the government of India in
2001, recommended to pay particular attention to these eight states
in terms of area-specific programs and action plans for efficient ser-
vice delivery in collaboration with various ministries of the union
and state governments. The NE states also were socioeconomically
less developed, and geographically isolated from the rest of India,
and represents about 4% of the total Indian population. We
excluded the state of Nagaland (an NE state) in our analysis because
DLHS-3 was not implemented there. We also excluded the high-
focus states of Jammu & Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh. These
two states are socioeconomically developed with better health out-
comes in terms of lower maternal and infant mortality rates along
with higher levels of the uptake of institutional health services than
the EAG states. Indeed their development is at a similar level to sev-
eral low-focus NRHM states. For instance, about 68% and 80% of
pregnant women had minimum three ANC visits and 45% and 71%
had institutional delivery in the pre-NRHM period (2000–04) in
Himachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir, respectively.
We used data from the repeated cross-sectional surveys of married
women from the District Level Household and Facility Surveys
(DLHS) Round 1 in 1995–99, Round 2 in 2000–04, Round 3 in
2007–08, Round 4 in 2011–12 and the Annual Health Survey (AHS)
in 2011–12. The DLHS Round 4 was not implemented in the EAG
states and Assam (one of the NE state). Instead, the AHS was
conducted in these states with relatively larger sample size than the
DLHS. The AHS followed the survey methodology and survey instru-
ments consistent with the DLHS. The AHS was conducted by the cen-
sus office, the Government of India, and the DLHS was conducted by
the International Institutes for Population Sciences (IIPS Mumbai), on
behalf of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of
India. The IIPS is an international research institute and is responsible
for the design, development of survey tools and software, training of
regional agencies entrusted to undertake the fieldwork in different
states, quality assurance and the overall supervision and management
of DLHS. The DLHS datasets are available for secondary data ana-
lysis for research purposes at nominal cost from IIPS, Mumbai, and
the AHS data set from the office of the census of India. The details of
the survey methods and survey instruments are available in the na-
tional level overview reports [http://www.rchiips.org/and http://censu
sindia.gov.in/]. Briefly, the surveys followed a systematic, multi-stage
stratified sampling design. Women were included in the study sample
if they reported a live birth, stillbirth or spontaneous or induced abor-
tion within a specified period of the interview date. This period was
an average of the past 4 years, being 1 January 1995 for DLHS-1,
2000 for DLHS-2, 2004 for DLHS-3 and 2008 for DLHS-4. We
included a reduced time window of 2007–08 for DLHS-3 to allow for
delays in implementation of NRHM across the country (this resulted
in relatively smaller analytical sample size for DLHS-3 compared with
DLHS-1 and DLHS-2). In the DLHS rounds, data on the use of mater-
nal healthcare were collected for the most recent birth. In the AHS,
however, the collection of data on the uptake of maternal healthcare
was limited to the period of 1 January 2011–31 December 2011. To
be consistent with the AHS data period, we included the reduced time
window of 2011–12 for DLHS-4 (rather than 2008–12). We retained
the period 2012 in the DLHS-4 to avoid the loss of sample size.
The respondents of DLHS-1 and 2 were currently married
women whereas the respondents of DLHS-3 and DLHS-4/AHS were
ever-married women. Thus DLHS-3 and DLHS-4/AHS were more
inclusive of mothers that were divorced, single or widowed. The age
profile of the respondents varied across the four rounds. DLHS-1
and DLHS-2 included women aged 15–44, but DLHS-3 and DLHS-
4/AHS included women 15–49. We, therefore, excluded women
who were aged 45–49 to ensure consistency across the survey
rounds. Missing observations relating to institutional delivery and
ANC were excluded from the analysis. The final analytical sample
size of married women aged 15–44 years, who had reported a live
birth, stillbirth, or spontaneous or induced abortion within a speci-
fied period of the interview date, was 131 531 in DLHS-1, 135 035
in DLHS-2, 65 090 in DLHS-3 and 400 702 in DLHS-4/AHS. To ad-
just for sample selection and post-stratification factors in the ana-
lysis, state-level sampling weights were used. The data analysis was
performed with Stata 13.0 (StataCorp 2014).
Definition of variables
The outcome variables were the uptake of institutional delivery and
ANC, both dichotomous variables (Yes¼1; No¼0). Institutional
delivery is defined as delivery in a healthcare facility of any type. For
ANC, we adhered to the JSY recommended number of at least three
ANC visits, either at a healthcare facility or a healthcare worker vis-
iting pregnant women to give ANC.
The location of residence (rural/urban), age of women at inter-
view, years of highest education (either of the respondent or hus-
band, whichever was the highest) and asset index were included in
the analysis. Asset index (a proxy for wealth and income) and years
of highest education were used as two distinct measures of
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socioeconomic position. The asset index used for the DLHS-3 was
the one originally provided in the dataset which was estimated using
principal component analysis of variables such as ownership of
house and its features, including toilet, electricity connection, cook-
ing gas, fridge, fan, television, radio, sewing machine and vehicles.
Asset scores for DLHS-1, DLHS-2 and DLHS-4/AHS were gener-
ated by the research team using the same approach (Filmer and
Pritchett 2001).
Analytical steps and statistical tools
The analysis followed two major steps. First, using the asset-related
and education-related relative index of inequality (RII), we meas-
ured the population level socioeconomic inequities in the uptake of
institutional delivery and ANC in the pre- and post-NRHM periods.
The RII is a regression-based measure of inequalities that takes the
whole socioeconomic distribution of population into account. When
the RII>1 relatively more women of higher socioeconomic position
than lower socioeconomic position utilise maternal healthcare, and
vice-versa for<1. Although other measures of inequalities are avail-
able, such as concentration index and absolute slope index of in-
equality, the RII is recommended for performing comparisons over
time or across populations (Kunst and Mackenbach 1990; Ernstsen
et al. 2012).
We measured socioeconomic position using asset indices and
educational attainments. To estimate the RII, we transformed these
into a summary measure, namely a ridit-score (separately for asset
and education groups), scaled from zero to one by arranging the
groups in order from lowest to highest socioeconomic position and
assigning the cumulative proportion of the population to each group
and is weighted to reflect the share of the sample at each asset score
and educational attainment (Harper and Lynch 2006). We used gen-
eralised linear models (log-binomial regression), with a logarithmic
link function to calculate RIIs (rate ratios) (Barros and Hirakata
2003; Spiegelman and Hertzmark 2005; Ernstsen et al. 2012).
Trends in RII over time were assessed by the inclusion of the inter-
action term of ridit-score and time, and the corresponding P-value
was reported in the study (Harper and Lynch 2006).
Second, using the pre-post difference-in-differences (DiD) models
adjusted for maternal age, parity, rural-urban, caste and state-level
fixed effects, we estimated the effects of NRHM for each wealth and
education tertile. In addition to the reference period data of pre-
NRHM period of 2000–04 (DLHS-2), we also have included the
pre-NRHM period data of 1995–99 (DLHS-1) to capture the pre-
NRHM trends in institutional delivery and ANC. Various socioeco-
nomic groups had differential uptake of maternal health services in
the pre-NRHM period and several confounders (other than
NRHM), such as various poverty alleviation programs and eco-
nomic growth, would differentially affect the socioeconomic tertiles
over time. Moreover, the JSY was launched by modifying the exist-
ing National Maternity Benefit Scheme (NMBS). The NMBS pro-
vided financial assistance of INR 500/- per birth (up to two live
births) to pregnant women aged 19 or more belonging to below the
poverty line (BPL) households. Thus, the use of two pre-NRHM
period data sets would allow us to control for the effect of NMBS
on the uptake of maternal healthcare. The DLHS data meet the two
key assumption of DiD method, namely the parallel trends assump-
tion and the stable unit treatment value assumptions. Per the parallel
trends assumption, the treatment and the control group would fol-
low the same time trend in the absence of the treatment, and any
change in data collection should not influence the trends. To our
knowledge, there were no specific changes in the data collection
over time to influence the trends as the DLHS data used the same
sampling framework and variables of interest across the three
rounds without any systematic undercounts or over counts for one
group. Similarly, the DLHS data satisfy the stable unit treatment
value assumption as there were no observable spill-over effects be-
tween treated units. We treated the lowest and middle wealth (and
education) tertile as the target group, and the highest tertile as the
non-target group. The basic form of our DiD model is the following:
Yi ¼ b0 þ b1:NRHMYeari þ b2:BaseYeari þ b3:SEPit
þ b4:NRHMYeariBaseYeariSEPit þ b5:parityit þ b6:ageit
þ b7:locationit þ b8:casteit þ b9:stateit þ eit
where Yi is the outcome indicator (institutional delivery or ANC) for
respondent ‘i’; NRHMYear¼1 if post-NRHM period (either 2007–
08 or 2011–12, as we estimated two models separately for each
post-NRHM period) and 0 if DLHS-2 (2000–04); BaseYear¼1 if
pre-NRHM period of DLHS-2 (2000–04) and 0 if DLHS-1 (1995–
99); SEP is defined to three socioeconomic (wealth or education) ter-
tiles; parity¼1 if the total number of reported live birth, stillbirth,
or spontaneous or induced abortion is>1, and 0 if otherwise; age
denotes age of the respondent, location¼1 if the respondent live in
urban location and 0 if in rural; caste is defined as three categories
of caste, namely scheduled caste/tribe, and forward caste; state is
defined as each individual state to capture the state-level fixed ef-
fects. The coefficients of the triple interaction terms measure the ef-
fects of NRHM for each socioeconomic tertile.
Results
Table 1 describes the four study samples. The mean age of the
women was 27.3 years in DLHS-1, 26.4 years in DLHS-2, 25.4
years in DLHS-3 and 26.1 years in DLHS-4/AHS.
Changes in uptake of institutional delivery and ANC
Most EAG and NE states had experienced considerable increase in
the uptake of institutional delivery from pre-NRHM Period 2 to
post-NRHM periods as compared with the change in the uptake
from pre-NRHM Period 1 to pre-NRHM Period 2 (Figure 1). For
instance, in the EAG states as a whole, there was an increase of 13
and 40 percentage points in the uptake of institutional delivery in
the early post-NRHM period 2007–08 (38.3%) and late post-
NRHM period 2011–12 (65.5%), respectively, from pre-NRHM
Period 2 of 2000–04 (24.8%) as against an increase of 7 percentage
points in pre-NRHM Period 2 from pre-NRHM Period 1 of 1995–
99 (18.5%) (Supplementary Table S1). Similarly, on one hand, in
the NE states, there was an increase of 8 and 33 percentage points in
the early post-NRHM period 2007–08 (42.6%) and late post-
NRHM period 2011–12 (68.0%) as against the increase of 6 per-
centage points in pre-NRHM Period 2 (34.9%) from pre-NRHM
Period 1(28.6%). On the other hand, there was no significant im-
provement in the uptake of ANC in the EAG states (23.2% in
1995–99, 29.2% in 2000–04 and 29.9% in 2007–08) but a moder-
ate increase was found in the NE states (36.2% in 1995–99, 45.0%
in 2000–04 and 51.8% in 2007–08) in the early post-NRHM period
2007–08. However, there was considerable improvement in the up-
take of ANC in the late post-NRHM period 2011–12 (57.5% in the
EAG and 72.9% in the NE states).
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Trends in inequity of the uptake of institutional
delivery and ANC
Figure 2 and Supplementary Tables S2 and S3 show the estimates
of RII. Large socio-economic inequities in the uptake of institu-
tional delivery and ANC, favouring higher socioeconomic groups,
were found in the pre-NRHM Periods 1 and 2. A similar pattern
was observed in the post-NRHM periods, but the magnitude of in-
equity in institutional delivery dropped considerably. For example,
in the EAG states the wealth-related RII for institutional delivery
fell from 14.5 [95% CI: 13.2; 15.9] in 1995–99 to 11.7 [95% CI:
11.2; 12.2] in 2000–04 (P of trend<0.001) to 3.6 [95% CI: 3.5; 3.
8] in 2007–08 (P of trend<0.001) to 1.3 [95% CI: 1.3; 1.3] in
2011–12 (P of trend<0.001). Although there was only a moderate
decline in inequity in the uptake of ANC between the pre- and the
early post-NRHM period 2007–08, there was considerable decline
in the late post-NRHM period 2011–12. In the EAG states, the
wealth-related RII fell from 9.3 [95% CI: 8.2; 10.6] in 1995–99 to
5.9 [95% CI: 5.6; 6.1] in 2000–04 (P of trend<0.001) to 4.5
[95% CI: 4.3; 4.8] in 2007–08 (P of trend<0.001) to 1.5 [95%
CI: 1.5; 1.5] in 2011–12 (P of trend<0.001). Similar pattern was
found in the NE states.
Effects of NRHM
The above-stated changes in inequity in the uptake of institutional
delivery were evident for each socioeconomic tertile too, as shown
by the observed probability and predicted probability in the uptake
for each wealth (Supplementary Figure S1) and education tertile
(Supplementary Figure S2). The observed probability in the uptake
of institutional delivery was greater than the predicted probability in
both EAG and NE states for each socioeconomic tertile, which
means a positive impacts of NRHM.
The estimated effects of NRHM showed that each socioeco-
nomic tertile in most of the EAG and NE states had positive
program effect in the uptake of institutional delivery in the early
post-NRHM period 2007–08 (Table 2). The lowest and middle ter-
tiles had greater impact in the uptake than the highest wealth and
education tertiles, particularly in the EAG states. In the EAG states,
the net increase in the uptake of institutional delivery in the early
post-NRHM period 2007–08 was 13.3% (b¼0.133; P<0.001),
15.7% (b¼0.157; P<0.001) and 5.3% (b¼0.053; P<0.001) for
the lowest, middle and highest wealth tertile, respectively. That is, in
the EAG states, there was 8.05% (95% CI: 7.98%, 8.12%) and
10.36% (95% CI: 10.28%, 10.44%) higher differential increase in
Table 1. Description of the study samples
DLHS-1 (1995–99) DLHS-2 (2000–04) DLHS-3 (2007–08) DLHS-4/AHS (2011–12)
N 131,531 135,035 65,090 400,702
Age (mean and SD) 27.3[5.7] 26.4[5.7] 25.4[5.3] 26.1[4.9]
Years of education (mean and SD) 2.6[4.1] 3.5[4.7] 3.7[4.5] 4.1[3.8]
Years of highest education in the family (mean and SD) 5.9[5.2] 6.3[5.2] 6.8[4.9] 6.9[4.9]
Rural (%) 85.0 80.1 74.5 73.3
Caste
SC (%) 19.6 21.0 21.4 20.3
ST (%) 10.4 10.7 17.7 10.5
Other caste (%) 69.9 68.1 60.9 69.2
Minimum three ante-natal care visits (%) 25.9 32.0 34.1 58.4
Institutional delivery (%) 20.6 26.6 39.1 65.4
Skilled birth attendance at home (%) 12.2 13.7 5.1 7.7
JSY finance benefit recipients (%) 18.0 49.1
Source: Authors estimates from the DLHS and the AHS data.
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Figure 1. Percentage of eligible women, age 15–44, using institutional delivery and ante-natal care in pre-NRHM periods (1995–99 and 2000–04) and post-NRHM
periods (2007–08 and 2011–12), in high-focus empowered action group (EAG) and north eastern (NE) Indian states. Notes: (i) Authors estimates from the DLHS
and the AHS data; ii) Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.
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the uptake of institutional delivery for the lowest and middle tertiles
over the highest wealth tertile, respectively. In the NE states, how-
ever, the uptake of institutional delivery increased, but with a lesser
magnitude of 4.4% (b¼0.044; P<0.01), 5.9% (b¼0.059;
P<0.001) and 3.7% (b¼0.037; P<0.05) for the lowest, middle
and highest wealth tertiles, respectively. That is, there was a moder-
ate differential increased the uptake of 0.7% (95% CI: 0.7%, 0.8%)
for the lowest and 2.2% (95% CI: 2.2%, 2.3%) for the middle ter-
tiles over the highest wealth tertile.
In the late post-NRHM period 2011–12, we found greater equity
in the uptake of institutional delivery. In the EAG states as a whole,
the net increase in the uptake of institutional delivery was 49%,
42% and 18% for the lowest, middle and highest wealth tertiles, re-
spectively (Table 3). Similarly, in the NE states, the net increase in
the uptake of institutional delivery was 31%, 22% and 7% for the
lowest, middle and highest wealth tertiles, respectively. Similar
trends were found for the education tertiles.
On the contrary, the observed probability in the uptake of
ANC was lower than the predicted probability in both EAG and
NE states for each socioeconomic tertile in the early post-NRHM
period 2007–08 (Supplementary Figure S1 and S2). Nevertheless,
negative effects in the uptake of ANC were found for each socio-
economic tertile in the early post-NRHM period 2007–08 (Table
2). In the EAG states as a whole, the uptake of ANC for the low-
est, middle and highest wealth tertiles decreased by 5.3% (b¼0.
053; P<0.001), 8.0% (b¼0.080; P<0.001) and 15.1%
(b¼0.151; P<0.001), respectively. In the NE states, there was
no significant effects for the uptake of ANC for the lowest and
middle wealth tertiles, but negative effects for the highest wealth
tertiles (b¼0.131; P<0.001). However, in the late post-
NRHM period 2011–12, there was considerable improvement in
the uptake of ANC, particularly for the lowest socioeconomic
tertiles (Table 3).
Interstate variations on the impacts of NRHM
Considerable inter-state variations were found on the population
level effects of NRHM in the uptake of both institutional delivery
and ANC. Of the eight EAG states, in the early post-NRHM period
2007–08, no impact of NRHM on the uptake of institutional deliv-
ery was found in the states of Jharkhand but positive impact was
found on the rest of the EAG states (Table 2). Of the seven NE
states, negative effect of NRHM in the uptake of institutional deliv-
ery was found among the low wealth tertiles in the states of Sikkim,
Manipur and Tripura, and no effect in Meghalaya. However, in the
late post-NRHM period 2011–12, the lowest and middle wealth
and education tertiles of the most states, except Manipur and
Tripura, had positive impact in the uptake in institutional delivery.
In the uptake of ANC in the early post-NRHM period 2007–08,
positive effect of NRHM was found particularly among the low
wealth tertile in the EAG states of Jharkhand and Bihar, and nega-
tive effects in the remaining six EAG states. In the NE states, among
the low wealth tertile, no impact in the uptake of ANC in
Arunanchal Pradesh, Assam and Sikkim, however, positive impact
in Manipur and Mizoram, and negative impact in Meghalaya and
Tripura, was found. In the late post-NRHM period 2011–12, posi-
tive impacts on the uptake of ANC were found among low and mid-
dle socioeconomic tertiles in most of the states, except Arunachal
Pradesh, Meghalaya and Tripura.
On one hand, we also found that the effects of JSY coverage and
NRHM in the uptake of institutional delivery and ANC showed a
similar pattern. For instance, in the early post-NRHM period 2007–
08, in Jharkhand where only 3.3% of the eligible women had
received JSY cash-transfer, there was no population level impact of
NRHM in the uptake of institutional delivery but positive impacts
in the uptake of ANC. But, in the late post-NRHM period 2011–12,
28% of the eligible women had received JSY cash-transfer, and this
was associated with positive impacts in the uptake of institutional
delivery as well. On the other hand, the three EAG states with higher
Figure 2. Wealth-related relative index of inequality (RII) in the uptake of institutional delivery and ante-natal care in pre-NRHM periods (1995–99 and 2000–04)
and post-NRHM periods (2007–08 and 2011–12), in high-focus empowered action group (EAG) and north eastern (NE) Indian states. Notes: (i) Authors estimates
from the DLHS and the AHS data. (ii) The RII value reported in the figure is (RII-1); (iii) positive values of the reported RII denotes inequity in favour of the rich; (iv)
error bars denote 95% confidence intervals.
84 Health Policy and Planning, 2017, Vol. 32, No. 1
T
a
b
le
2
.
E
ff
e
ct
s
o
f
N
R
H
M
in
th
e
u
p
ta
ke
o
f
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
a
l
d
e
li
v
e
ry
a
n
d
a
n
te
-n
a
ta
l
ca
re
a
m
o
n
g
w
e
a
lt
h
a
n
d
e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
te
rt
il
e
s
in
th
e
e
a
rl
y
p
o
st
-N
R
H
M
p
e
ri
o
d
2
0
0
7
–0
8
,
in
h
ig
h
-f
o
cu
s
e
m
p
o
w
e
re
d
a
ct
io
n
g
ro
u
p
(E
A
G
)
a
n
d
n
o
rt
h
e
a
st
e
rn
(N
E
)
In
d
ia
n
st
a
te
s
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
a
l
d
el
iv
er
y
A
n
te
-n
a
ta
l
ca
re
W
ea
lt
h
te
rt
il
es
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
te
rt
il
es
W
ea
lt
h
te
rt
il
es
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
te
rt
il
es
L
o
w
es
t
te
rt
il
e
(1
)
M
id
d
le
te
rt
il
e
(2
)
H
ig
h
es
t
te
rt
il
e
(3
)
L
o
w
es
t
te
rt
il
e
(4
)
M
id
d
le
te
rt
il
e
(5
)
H
ig
h
es
t
te
rt
il
e
(6
)
L
o
w
es
t
te
rt
il
e
(7
)
M
id
d
le
te
rt
il
e
(8
)
H
ig
h
es
t
te
rt
il
e
(9
)
L
o
w
es
t
te
rt
il
e
(1
0
)
M
id
d
le
te
rt
il
e
(1
1
)
H
ig
h
es
t
te
rt
il
e
(1
2
)
E
A
G
st
a
te
s
Jh
a
rk
h
a
n
d
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
2
0
.0
3
6
0
.0
2
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
3
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
1
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
2
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
3
0
.0
5
6
0
.0
2
*
*
0
.1
4
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.1
1
6
0
.0
3
*
*
0
.0
7
6
0
.0
2
*
*
0
.0
7
6
0
.0
2
*
*
0
.0
3
6
0
.0
3
U
tt
a
r
P
ra
d
es
h
0
.0
7
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
1
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
7
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
1
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
1
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
1
B
ih
a
r
0
.1
3
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.2
1
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.1
6
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.1
2
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
2
0
.0
7
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.1
3
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
5
6
0
.0
2
*
*
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.1
7
6
0
.0
2
*
C
h
h
a
tt
is
g
a
rh
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
7
6
0
.0
3
*
*
0
.0
7
6
0
.0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.0
5
6
0
.0
3
0
.2
2
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.2
9
6
0
.0
4
*
0
.3
8
6
0
.0
4
*
0
.1
0
6
0
.0
3
*
*
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
4
*
0
.2
6
6
0
.0
4
*
U
tt
a
ra
k
h
a
n
d
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
3
*
*
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
5
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
3
*
*
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
3
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
5
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
3
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
4
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
5
0
.0
3
6
0
.0
3
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
4
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
5
R
a
ja
st
h
a
n
0
.2
1
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.2
0
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.1
2
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.1
9
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.2
2
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.1
8
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.1
3
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.2
0
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.2
2
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.0
7
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
2
*
O
ri
ss
a
0
.1
1
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.1
6
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.1
1
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.1
4
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.1
6
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
3
*
*
0
.0
7
6
0
.0
2
*
*
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.1
3
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
2
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
3
*
*
M
a
d
h
y
a
P
ra
d
es
h
0
.3
1
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.3
9
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.2
2
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.3
5
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.4
1
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.2
5
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.1
3
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.2
3
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
1
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
2
0
.1
7
6
0
.0
2
*
A
ll
E
A
G
st
a
te
s
0
.1
3
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.1
6
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
5
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.1
4
6
0
.0
0
*
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
7
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
5
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
3
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
1
0
.1
0
6
0
.0
0
*
N
E
st
a
te
s
A
ru
n
a
n
ch
a
l
P
ra
d
es
h
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
3
6
0
.0
4
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
4
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
3
*
*
0
.1
2
6
0
.0
4
*
*
0
.1
1
6
0
.0
4
*
*
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
3
0
.1
4
6
0
.0
4
*
*
0
.2
1
6
0
.0
4
*
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
3
*
*
*
0
.0
3
6
0
.0
4
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
4
A
ss
a
m
0
.2
0
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.1
7
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
3
*
*
0
.1
8
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.2
2
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.2
7
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.0
3
6
0
.0
2
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
3
*
*
0
.3
1
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
2
*
*
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
3
0
.1
4
6
0
.0
3
*
M
eg
h
a
la
y
a
0
.0
3
6
0
.0
4
0
.1
7
6
0
.0
4
*
0
.2
9
6
0
.0
4
*
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
3
0
.2
4
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.1
9
6
0
.0
5
*
0
.1
9
6
0
.0
5
*
0
.0
3
6
0
.0
4
0
.1
1
6
0
.0
5
*
*
*
0
.0
3
6
0
.0
4
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
5
0
.0
5
6
0
.0
5
S
ik
k
im
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
7
*
*
*
0
.2
1
6
0
.0
7
*
*
0
.2
2
6
0
.0
7
*
*
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
6
0
.2
3
6
0
.0
7
*
*
0
.1
9
6
0
.0
6
*
*
0
.0
3
6
0
.0
7
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
7
0
.2
9
6
0
.0
7
*
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
6
0
.0
5
6
0
.0
7
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
6
M
a
n
ip
u
r
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
5
0
.1
1
6
0
.0
6
0
.0
5
6
0
.0
3
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
5
*
*
0
.1
6
6
0
.0
6
*
*
0
.2
1
6
0
.0
5
*
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
5
0
.1
1
6
0
.0
5
*
*
*
0
.1
1
6
0
.0
4
*
*
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
5
*
*
0
.1
4
6
0
.0
5
*
*
T
ri
p
u
ra
0
.2
5
6
0
.0
7
*
*
0
.3
6
6
0
.0
8
*
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
7
*
*
*
0
.3
2
6
0
.0
7
*
0
.2
0
6
0
.0
7
*
*
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
8
0
.5
4
6
0
.0
7
*
0
.4
4
6
0
.0
8
*
0
.2
2
6
0
.0
7
*
*
0
.4
0
6
0
.0
7
*
0
.3
8
6
0
.0
7
*
0
.1
3
6
0
.0
8
M
iz
o
ra
m
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
5
*
*
0
.2
4
6
0
.0
5
*
0
.1
0
6
0
.0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
5
6
0
.0
4
0
.0
3
6
0
.0
4
0
.0
5
6
0
.0
5
0
.4
6
6
0
.0
5
*
0
.4
0
6
0
.0
5
*
0
.1
7
6
0
.0
4
*
0
.2
4
6
0
.0
5
*
0
.1
7
6
0
.0
4
*
0
.1
3
6
0
.0
5
*
*
*
A
ll
N
E
st
a
te
s
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
1
*
*
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
7
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.1
0
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
2
0
.0
3
6
0
.0
2
0
.1
3
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
2
*
*
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
2
*
N
o
te
s:
(i
)
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
a
re
a
v
er
a
g
e
tr
ea
tm
en
ts
ef
fe
ct
s
6
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
;
(i
i)
th
e
m
o
d
el
s
w
er
e
es
ti
m
a
te
d
se
p
a
ra
te
ly
fo
r
w
ea
lt
h
a
n
d
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
te
rt
il
es
,
a
n
d
re
p
ea
te
d
fo
r
ea
ch
st
a
te
a
n
d
st
a
te
g
ro
u
p
s,
a
ft
er
co
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
fo
r
a
g
e,
ru
ra
l-
u
rb
a
n
,
p
a
ri
ty
a
n
d
ca
st
e;
(i
ii
)
*
P
<
0
.0
0
1
,
*
*
P
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
*
P
<
0
.0
5
;
(i
v
)
th
e
es
ti
m
a
te
s
w
er
e
fr
o
m
d
a
ta
o
f
D
L
H
S
-1
(1
9
9
5
–
9
9
),
D
L
H
S
-2
(2
0
0
1
–
0
4
)
a
n
d
D
L
H
S
-3
(2
0
0
7
–
0
8
).
Health Policy and Planning, 2017, Vol. 32, No. 1 85
T
a
b
le
3
.
E
ff
e
ct
s
o
f
N
R
H
M
in
th
e
u
p
ta
ke
o
f
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
a
l
d
e
li
v
e
ry
a
n
d
a
n
te
-n
a
ta
l
ca
re
a
m
o
n
g
w
e
a
lt
h
a
n
d
e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
te
rt
il
e
s
in
th
e
la
te
p
o
st
-N
R
H
M
p
e
ri
o
d
2
0
1
1
1
2
,
in
h
ig
h
-f
o
cu
s
e
m
p
o
w
e
re
d
a
ct
io
n
g
ro
u
p
(E
A
G
)
a
n
d
n
o
rt
h
e
a
st
e
rn
(N
E
)
In
d
ia
n
st
a
te
s
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
a
l
d
el
iv
er
y
A
n
te
-n
a
ta
l
ca
re
W
ea
lt
h
te
rt
il
es
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
te
rt
il
es
W
ea
lt
h
te
rt
il
es
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
te
rt
il
es
L
o
w
es
t
te
rt
il
e
(1
)
M
id
d
le
te
rt
il
e
(2
)
H
ig
h
es
t
te
rt
il
e
(3
)
L
o
w
es
t
te
rt
il
e
(4
)
M
id
d
le
te
rt
il
e
(5
)
H
ig
h
es
t
te
rt
il
e
(6
)
L
o
w
es
t
te
rt
il
e
(7
)
M
id
d
le
te
rt
il
e
(8
)
H
ig
h
es
t
te
rt
il
e
(9
)
L
o
w
es
t
te
rt
il
e
(1
0
)
M
id
d
le
te
rt
il
e
(1
1
)
H
ig
h
es
t
te
rt
il
e
(1
2
)
E
A
G
st
a
te
s
Jh
a
rk
h
a
n
d
0
.2
4
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.2
7
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.2
0
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.2
2
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.2
3
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.1
8
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.3
8
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.4
7
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.3
0
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.3
9
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.3
3
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.1
9
6
0
.0
3
*
U
tt
a
r
P
ra
d
es
h
0
.4
5
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.3
9
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.1
8
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.4
1
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.3
9
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.2
8
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.2
2
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.1
8
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.1
2
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.2
6
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.2
8
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.2
8
6
0
.0
1
*
B
ih
a
r
0
.4
6
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.4
5
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.1
9
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.4
6
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.3
1
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.3
1
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.3
4
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.3
9
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.2
7
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
7
6
0
.0
2
*
C
h
h
a
tt
is
g
a
rh
0
.2
6
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.2
9
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
3
*
*
*
0
.2
9
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.2
7
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
3
*
*
0
.1
0
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.1
2
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.2
8
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.1
4
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
3
0
.1
7
6
0
.0
3
*
U
tt
a
ra
k
h
a
n
d
0
.3
8
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.4
2
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.3
1
6
0
.0
4
*
0
.3
0
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.3
5
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.2
3
6
0
.0
5
*
0
.3
2
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.2
5
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.2
0
6
0
.0
4
*
0
.3
1
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.3
2
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.2
2
6
0
.0
5
*
R
a
ja
st
h
a
n
0
.5
3
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.4
8
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.2
9
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.5
3
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.4
6
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.3
4
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.2
6
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.1
7
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.0
5
6
0
.0
2
*
*
0
.2
9
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.2
9
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.1
3
6
0
.0
2
*
O
ri
ss
a
0
.5
1
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.3
5
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.4
9
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.3
8
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
2
0
.3
4
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.1
1
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.0
5
6
0
.0
2
0
.4
4
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.2
8
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
2
M
a
d
h
y
a
P
ra
d
es
h
0
.6
5
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.5
7
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.2
6
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.6
5
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.5
7
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.2
7
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.4
2
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.2
9
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
2
0
.4
9
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.4
3
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
2
*
A
ll
E
A
G
st
a
te
s
0
.4
9
6
0
.0
0
*
0
.4
2
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.1
8
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.4
4
6
0
.0
0
*
0
.4
0
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.1
9
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.3
1
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.2
2
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
7
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.3
4
6
0
.0
0
*
0
.3
3
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
1
*
N
E
st
a
te
s
A
ru
n
a
n
ch
a
l
P
ra
d
es
h
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
3
*
*
0
.1
0
6
0
.0
4
*
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
4
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.1
3
6
0
.0
4
*
0
.0
5
6
0
.0
3
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
4
*
*
0
.1
4
6
0
.0
4
*
0
.0
5
6
0
.0
3
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
3
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
4
*
*
*
A
ss
a
m
0
.5
5
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.4
3
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.1
9
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.4
9
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.4
7
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.4
2
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.4
0
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.1
3
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.1
9
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.4
3
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.4
3
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
3
M
eg
h
a
la
y
a
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
4
*
0
.4
2
6
0
.0
4
*
0
.4
5
6
0
.0
5
*
0
.2
1
6
0
.0
3
*
0
.4
1
6
0
.0
4
*
0
.3
3
6
0
.0
5
*
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
5
0
.2
3
6
0
.0
5
*
0
.2
5
6
0
.0
5
*
0
.1
7
6
0
.0
4
*
0
.1
9
6
0
.0
5
*
0
.1
3
6
0
.0
5
*
S
ik
k
im
0
.2
4
6
0
.0
6
*
0
.1
3
6
0
.0
7
0
.1
6
6
0
.0
7
*
*
0
.2
4
6
0
.0
6
*
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
7
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
6
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
6
*
*
*
0
.0
3
6
0
.0
7
0
.2
3
6
0
.0
6
*
0
.1
2
6
0
.0
6
*
*
*
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
7
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
6
M
a
n
ip
u
r
0
.0
5
6
0
.0
5
0
.1
2
6
0
.0
5
*
*
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
5
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
3
*
*
0
.0
7
6
0
.0
5
0
.1
4
6
0
.0
6
*
*
0
.2
2
6
0
.0
5
*
0
.1
2
6
0
.0
5
*
*
*
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
5
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
4
*
*
*
0
.1
4
6
0
.0
5
*
*
0
.2
6
6
0
.0
5
*
T
ri
p
u
ra
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
7
0
.1
0
6
0
.0
8
0
.0
3
6
0
.0
7
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
7
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
7
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
7
0
.2
0
6
0
.0
7
*
*
0
.2
2
6
0
.0
8
*
*
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
7
*
*
*
0
.2
2
6
0
.0
7
*
0
.1
7
6
0
.0
7
*
*
0
.1
4
6
0
.0
7
M
iz
o
ra
m
0
.2
8
6
0
.0
5
*
0
.4
1
6
0
.0
5
*
0
.1
7
6
0
.0
4
*
0
.2
1
6
0
.0
4
*
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
4
*
*
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
4
*
*
*
0
.3
8
6
0
.0
5
*
0
.4
0
6
0
.0
5
*
0
.1
9
6
0
.0
4
*
0
.2
4
6
0
.0
4
*
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
4
0
.1
0
6
0
.0
5
*
*
*
A
ll
N
E
st
a
te
s
0
.4
2
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.3
1
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.3
6
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.3
4
6
0
.0
1
0
.2
9
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.3
3
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.1
2
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.0
7
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.3
4
6
0
.0
1
*
0
.2
0
6
0
.0
2
*
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
2
*
*
N
o
te
s:
(i
)
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
a
re
a
v
er
a
g
e
tr
ea
tm
en
ts
ef
fe
ct
s
6
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
;
(i
i)
th
e
m
o
d
el
s
w
er
e
es
ti
m
a
te
d
se
p
a
ra
te
ly
fo
r
w
ea
lt
h
a
n
d
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
te
rt
il
es
,
a
n
d
re
p
ea
te
d
fo
r
ea
ch
st
a
te
a
n
d
st
a
te
g
ro
u
p
s,
a
ft
er
co
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
fo
r
a
g
e,
ru
ra
l-
u
rb
a
n
,
p
a
ri
ty
a
n
d
ca
st
e;
(i
ii
)
*
P
<
0
.0
0
1
,
*
*
P
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
*
P
<
0
.0
5
;
(i
v
)
th
e
es
ti
m
a
te
s
w
er
e
fr
o
m
d
a
ta
o
f
D
L
H
S
-1
(1
9
9
5
–
9
9
),
D
L
H
S
-2
(2
0
0
1
–
0
4
)
a
n
d
D
L
H
S
-4
/A
H
S
(2
0
1
1
–
1
2
).
86 Health Policy and Planning, 2017, Vol. 32, No. 1
levels of JSY coverage in 2007–08, namely, Rajasthan (32.5%),
Orissa (38.9%) and Madhya Pradesh (42.8%) had positive popula-
tion level effects in the uptake of institutional delivery.
Variation in impacts between wealth
and education groups
We found almost similar pattern on the RII and the effects between
wealth and education measures of socioeconomic position. For ex-
ample, in the EAG states in the early post-NRHM period 2007–08,
the effects of NRHM in the uptake of institutional delivery for the
lowest (b¼0.133; P<0.001), middle (b¼0.157; P<0.001) and
highest wealth tertiles (b¼0.053; P<0.001) are similar to the low-
est education (b¼0.14; P<0.001), middle education (b¼0.15;
P<0.001) and highest education tertiles (b¼0.07; P<0.001).
However, there were few instances of inconsistent pattern of our re-
sults in some states between wealth and education tertiles.
JSY coverage and inequity over time
Only 17.9% of the eligible women in the EAG states (ranging from
3% in Jharkhand to 43% in Madhya Pradesh) and 18.5% of the eli-
gible women in the NE states (ranging from 3% in Meghalaya to
30% in Mizoram) received financial incentives from the JSY in the
early post-NRHM period 2007–08 (Supplementary Table S1).
There was an increase in the percentage of eligible women receiving
financial incentives in the late post-NRHM period 2011–12, being
48.6% in the EAG (ranging from 28% in Jharkhand to 76.6% in
Madhya Pradesh) and 56.3% in the NE states (ranging from 12.7%
in Meghalaya to 56.7% in Assam). Furthermore, there was inequity
in the receipt of JSY, that is, people from higher socioeconomic
groups benefited more than the people from lower socioeconomic
groups in the early post-NRHM period 2007–08, and this pattern
had reversed or attenuated in the late post-NRHM period 2011–12.
The wealth-related RII in receipt of JSY incentives declined from 1.3
(95% CI: 1.2; 1.4) in 2007–08 to 0.95 (95% CI: 0.94; 0.97) in
2011–12 in the EAG states and from 3.6 (95% CI: 2.8; 4.7) to 1.14
(95% CI: 1.10; 1.19) in the NE states.
Robustness
Besides using the RII for measuring the inequity, we used both the
slope index of inequality and concentration index, another widely
used measures of inequity that take the whole socioeconomic distri-
bution of population into account, and we found that a similar pat-
tern of inequity in the uptake in the pre- and post-NRHM periods.
The DiD estimates were re-estimated for different wealth and educa-
tion quintiles and quartiles, and found the effects similar to that of
the tertiles.
We estimated changes in the uptake of skilled birth-attendance
at home in the pre- and post-NRHM periods. We found that the per-
centage of eligible women who used skilled birth-attendance at
home increased between the pre-NRHM Period 1 (1995–99) and
the pre-NRHM Period 2 (2000–04), but decreased in the post-
NRHM period (2007–08). In the EAG states as a whole, the per-
centage of women who used skilled birth-attendance at home
increased from 13% to 14% in the pre-NRHM periods and then
decreased to 5% in the early post-NRHM period 2007–08, and fur-
ther increased to 8% in the late post-NRHM period 2011–12. The
corresponding estimates for the NE states are 10–12% in the pre-
NRHM periods to 5% in the early post-NRHM period 2007–08 to
5% in the late post-NRHM period 2011–12. We further estimated
the skilled birth-attendance consisting of both institutional delivery
and skilled birth-attendance at home, and found that there was only
moderate increase in the early post-NRHM period 2007–08 but
considerable increase in the late post-NRHM period 2011–12. That
is, over the time periods of 1995–99, 2000–04, 2007–08 and 2011–
12, the skilled birth-attendance had increased from 31% to 39% to
43% to 73% in the EAG states and 39% to 47% to 48% to 72% in
the NE states.
We also tested the quality of ANC by examining whether there
were changes in the uptake of the Iron Folic Acid (IFA) supplemen-
tation and the Tetanus Toxoid (TT) injections. We found, on one
hand, in 1995–99, 2000–04, 2007–08 and 2011–12, there was im-
provement in the use of IFA from 33% to 49% to 79% to 88% in
the EAG states, respectively. On the other hand, there was decrease
in the uptake of TT injection in EAG states in 2007–08 (from 65%
to 74% to 65%) but again increased to 97% in 2011–12. In the NE
states, there was an increase in the uptake of TT injection over time
(from 61% to 64% to 71% to 96%).
Discussion
In this study, we assessed the population-level impact of NRHM on
socioeconomic inequities in the uptake of two major components of
maternal health services, namely institutional delivery and ANC.
We found evidence supporting our hypotheses that the effect of
NRHM in the uptake of institutional delivery among pregnant
women from lower socioeconomic backgrounds was greater than
the effect on women from higher socioeconomic backgrounds. The
inequities in institutional delivery and ANC were already declining
between the pre-NRHM Period 1 (1995–99) and the pre-NRHM
Period 2 (2000–04), but declined at steeper rates in the post-NRHM
periods. The effects were stronger for institutional delivery. Our
findings also support our hypothesis that the effects of NRHM on
the increase in the uptake and the decline in socioeconomic inequi-
ties were greater for institutional delivery than ANC in the early
post-NRHM period 2007–08. This pattern was more evident in
those states with higher proportion of eligible women enrolled under
JSY cash-transfer. One of the reasons can be that the conditional
cash-transfer linked to institutional delivery might have attracted
huge attention to the promotion of institutional delivery, and thus
neglecting other components of maternal and child healthcare such
as ANC and child immunisation. This finding highlights the need
within NRHM to link antenatal services with institutional delivery
to achieve a continuity of maternal health services (Lahariya 2009).
Equity and uptake of institutional delivery and ANC improved in
most states in late post-NRHM period 2011–12, the period when
the targeted outreach of the most components of the NRHM was
reached.
Our study also found considerable inter-state variations in the
impacts of the NRHM and the proportion of eligible women that
received cash transfers. To address these inter-state variations, the
central government in collaboration with the low performing state
governments needs to implement appropriate policy measures,
including of ensuring the availability of functional and trained
ASHAs in each village, increased cash-transfer amount for the preg-
nant women, higher incentives for the ASHAs and good quality
health services at the public health facilities. Furthermore, conduct-
ing state-wise in-depth evaluation studies, using both quantitative
and qualitative methods, for identifying the underlying reasons for
the inter-state variations would be useful for formulating effective
policy guidelines.
Over the past few years, several low- and middle-income coun-
tries including Mexico, Columbia, Nicaragua, Honduras and Brazil
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have introduced public health and social security programs with
cash-transfer to increase the use of health services by poor people
(Attanasio et al. 2005). Studies have found increase in the use of
health services and health status (Gertler 2000; Morris 2004; Rivera
2004; Maluccio and Flores 2005; Lagarde et al. 2009). For example,
‘Familias en Accion’ of Columbia improved the nutritional status
and reduced the morbidity of young children (Attanasio et al. 2005).
The ‘Bolsa Alimentac¸~ao’ of Brazil also improved health care use by
children (Shei 2014). A recent study found that the combined effects
of Brazil’s massive expansion of primary health care via the ‘Family
Health Program’ and the cash-transfer of ‘Bolsa Alimentac¸~ao’ suc-
cessfully reduced post-neonatal infant mortality (Guanais 2013).
Several studies have assessed the impact of India’s JSY (Lim et al.
2010; Modugu 2013; Carvalho 2014; Randive 2014), and we have
added to this evidence base by assessing the overall impact of
NRHM at the population level. Our impact assessment included the
larger components of the program including the JSY payments, the
large scale public healthcare investment followed after 2005, and
the deployment of grassroots level health workers (i.e. ASHA), and
several healthcare committees at various levels including those with
community involvement for enhancing the uptake of primary
healthcare. Further, the nationally representative household level
data covering major Indian states, which were collected independ-
ently of the NRHM, enabled us to perform a comparative assess-
ment of impacts of NRHM between the states. In addition, to
ensure more robust impact assessment we used two pre-NRHM
period data, as suggested by the literature of impact assessment in
other contexts (Wagstaff 2009, 2010). The use of two pre-NRHM
and two post-NRHM data points had helped us to apply a quasi-
natural experiment framework to control for potential confounders
and secular trends. The NRHM was changed to the National Health
Mission (NHM) in 2013, which is now made up of NRHM and the
National Urban Health Mission. The latter element was launched to
meet the primary health care needs of the urban population with a
focus on the urban poor. The use of the latest available data set of
DLH-4 and AHS had allowed us to assess the impact of a more com-
prehensive form of this public health program after its almost full
implementation and widest outreach.
Our study has several limitations. First, the NRHM is a targeted
public health program intending to enhance the uptake of primary
healthcare especially of lower socioeconomic groups, but is charac-
terised as a population level intervention where all segments of the
population can benefit. This makes it difficult to define the treatment
and control group in strict sense as per standard impact evaluation
methodology. Instead, we opted to define lower socioeconomic
groups as target groups and the higher socioeconomic as the non-
target groups. Second, we estimated the effects on the assumption of
a linear increase in the uptake of maternal health services in the post-
NRHM periods based on the trends of the pre-NRHM Periods 1 and
2. This assumption may not hold true in the real world setting, and
increases in the uptake over the period of time are likely to occur at
diminishing rates as it becomes increasingly difficult to reach the
most vulnerable population groups. However, since we used both in-
stitutional delivery and ANC as maternal health services outcomes
for comparative assessment, we assume that these possible external
factors would in general affect both outcomes in a similar way.
The study findings have important implications for health policy
in India and other developing countries, particularly in the present
context of growing debate in India and other developing countries
on various strategies of developing the health system and achieving
universal coverage, which is centred on two paths: strengthening the
supply side of the public healthcare system along with targeted
interventions and strengthening demand-side financing by promot-
ing health insurance programmes with larger roles for private
healthcare providers (World Health Organization 2010). The report
of the High Level Expert Group (HLEG) established by the Indian
Planning Commission recommended for strengthening the public
healthcare system instead of relying on the health insurance option
(Planning Commission 2011). However, recently, concerns have
been raised about India’s healthcare policy shifts, including the pro-
posal to reduce government funds for NRHM, and to rely more on
the private health sector in primary healthcare (Staff Reporter 2014;
Reeves et al. 2015). Our findings suggest that strengthening public
healthcare infrastructure, using public health intervention programs
with focus on the weaker sections of the society and increased re-
source allocation, will enhance the uptake of maternal healthcare,
improve health outcomes and contribute to the achievement of the
health-related Millennium Development Goals. Giving due consid-
erations to the effective design and implementation of the public
health programs by linking various components of maternal and
child healthcare will improve universal access to comprehensive
healthcare. Previous studies have argued that socially disadvantaged
individuals with less education and living in places with poor health
facilities fail to perceive the need for accessing healthcare (Gulliford
et al. 2002; Sen 2002; Vellakkal et al. 2013). Our results indicate
that over-coming financial and other structural barriers through
programs focussing lower socioeconomic groups, rather than psy-
chological perceptions of poor people, are likely to promote uptake
and reduce inequities in uptake of maternal and child healthcare.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary data are available at HEAPOL online
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